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Abstract 
This article discusses examples of strategies employed by representatives of Russia’s new 
social upper class to acquire social distinction. By the late 2000s many of the upper-class 
Russians included in this study distanced themselves from the conspicuous ostentation 
ascribed to the brutish 1990s. Instead, they strove to gain legitimacy for their social position 
by no longer aggressively displaying their wealth, but instead elaborating more refined and 
individualized tastes and manners and reviving a more cultured image and self-image. These 
changes found their expression in various modes of social distinction ranging from external 
signs, such as fashion and cars, to ostentation vicariously exercised through the people these 
upper-class Russians surrounded themselves with.  
 
The article will trace these interviewees’ strategies for distinction in the late 2000s by 
discussing tastes in lifestyle and consumption as well as adornment through sartorial signs 
and through vicarious ostentation, as exemplified by their choice of female company. 
Changing attitudes towards vehicles and modes of transport, with special regards to the 
Moscow Metro, will serve as a further illustration of modes of distinction. Crucial for this 
discussion is the role of the Russian/Soviet intelligentsia, both for vicarious status assertion 
and elite distinction anchored in the interviewees’ social backgrounds.  
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Introduction 
 
This article discusses the strategies adopted for social distinction among representatives of 
Russia’s new upper class as a means of gaining legitimacy for their position in society. These 
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strategies will be explored using examples of adornment, such as sartorial displays and 
female companions, attitudes to transport as well as the striving for a more cultured image by 
aligning themselves with the intelligentsia. Central to my analysis are the strategies by which 
these social actors reinterpreted their experiences and reoriented their demeanour and tastes 
in order to keep up with the social changes in post-Soviet Russia and, in particular, towards 
the end of first decade in the new millennium. 
 
Whilst the 1990s had been dominated by a small group of oligarchs, during the course of the 
2000s the organization of social life went beyond the basic liaisons which had been 
necessary for survival in the ‘dog-eat-dog’ world of the 1990s. Against the background of the 
oil boom, a wider layer of the wealthy emerged and established a place for itself close to but 
below that of the top elites. By the late 2000s, upper-class members seemed to have become 
accustomed to their material wellbeing. Things other than money began to matter. Especially 
with the arrival of the 2008 economic crisis, a concern emerged about how to strengthen their 
position and status in society and have them become enduring. This article takes as its 
starting point the assumption that for social relationships of domination to be enduring the 
dominating classes have to be considered legitimate and that this legitimacy is derived from a 
valid source of authority.  
 
As Weber (1978[1922]: 213) reiterated, authority originates in both the belief in legitimacy 
[Legitimitätsglaube] and the prestige of exemplarity and ideality [Vorbildlichkeit]. Authority is 
considered legitimate when it conforms to the values dominant in society and when it satisfies 
normative expectations (Beetham 1991: 10ff.). In this quest to gain worthiness and legitimacy 
for their position in society, the holders of power, status and wealth try to convince 
themselves and others that they have what they have because of who they are, that is, 
because of the quality of their own being. One important way in which dominating classes 
achieve exemplarity and legitimacy is, alongside merit-based achievements and care for the 
less fortunate, by demonstrating their social worth through distinction from others. Using a 
Weberian framework, this article seeks to analyse which strategies are deployed by 
representatives of Russia’s contemporary upper class to obtain legitimacy through practices 
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aimed at achieving social distinction, in society in general as well as vis-à-vis their peers, 
people in adjacent classes further up and down the social ladder and, not least, themselves.  
 
The forms through which the upper-class members considered in this study attempted to 
obtain social distinction by the late 2000s differed strongly from the demonstrative ostentation 
and conspicuous consumption of the 1990s (cf. Lipovetsky 2003; Oushakine 2000; 
Shlapentokh 1999). This article suggests that the new manners and demeanour these 
individuals feature, and the tastes they claim to identify with, is a reworking of culturedness, 
or kul’turnost’. One way to understand kul’turnost’, a term which goes back to the 1930s, is to 
see it as a behaviour code that guides civilized consumption, tastes and manners; however, it 
is more of an internalized unconscious disposition – not unlike Bourdieu’s notion of habitus1 – 
than explicit formal rules of good behaviour (Gronow 2003: 147).  
 
Dunham (1976: 22) described the evolution of kul’turnost’ in the 1930s as first denoting little 
more than personal hygiene and a minimum knowledge of high culture and good manners. In 
the late Stalin era, however, it began to mean the self-image of dignified citizens and turned 
into ‘a fetish notion of how to be individually civilized’. The special function of kul’turnost’ was 
to ‘encode the proper relationship between people through their possessions and labels; 
between mores and artifacts’ (Dunham 1976: 22). According to Dunham, kul’turnost’ ‘might 
even shake the individual’s grip on his possessions: for instance, a strategic abstinence from 
acquisitiveness for the sake of displaying “good taste”’. In this trajectory, kul’turnost’ bestowed 
attributes of dignity and virtue on material possessions (Dunham 1976: 23), and it functioned 
as social glue between cultural and material goods (Kelly and Shepherd 1998: 304). This 
article’s claim is that today, again, kul’turnost’ serves the quest for social distinction, thereby 
bridging the gap between money and culture.  
 
This article further argues that kul’turnost’ is one of the main pillars that bestow on their 
holders the discreet and seemingly natural superiority which Bourdieu (1984) ascribed to 
dominant classes. For the feeling of superiority to develop a more discreet nature, modes of 
distinction had to change from primarily quantitative to more qualitative strategies, and 
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various forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986) had to be converted into others, in particular 
economic capital into cultural capital. These processes were, in some ways, following a shift 
from the typical Veblenian forms of aggressive ostentation (1994[1899]), to what Elias 
(2005[1989]) considered to be the norm in industrialized societies, where one feels able to 
enjoy great prestige without having to provide permanent public proof of it through costly 
display and where people’s habits and manners are subject to ever-stricter control. However, 
this is not a linear process, and in particular in Russia, against the background of the 
country’s distinctive post-Soviet economic and social developments, these processes have 
been full of reversals, tensions and ambiguities. Therefore, following Daloz (2009), who has 
compared the ways in which elites in different cultures display themselves publicly, it is crucial 
within the Russian context to also include ostentatious forms of distinction. 
 
For present-day visitors to Russia, conspicuous consumption might still seem omnipresent. 
Indeed, several types of social logic exist in parallel. In the 2000s, newcomers made their way 
up into the ranks of the rich and kept Russia’s ‘glamour culture’ flourishing (Goscilo and 
Strukov 2011; Menzel 2008). Putin’s elite started to rise. Russian provinces became stronger. 
Resource-rich former Soviet republics produced new layers of wealthy people. For these 
groups, visible pomp and opulence appeared to be indispensable and they started living their 
new wealth, in a Veblenian sense, ostentatiously. Veblen (1994[1899]: chapter V) and later 
Simmel (1919) argued that new fashions, introduced via the elite, would pass down through 
the status hierarchy. Aspiring middle-class groups in Russia have acquired a fixation on 
certain branded clothes, expensive cars and glamorous leisure time activities. Due to their 
visibility, these are the groups which are still the most prominent in the public consciousness, 
and which have been the focus of popular stereotypes.  
 
My empirical data include 40 qualitative narrative-biographical interviews, conducted in 
Moscow and in London between 2008 and 2011, with rich businessmen, businesswomen, 
their spouses and their (adult) children as well as with public figures in the arts, media and 
politics. These people come for the most part from the lower end of the richest one per cent of 
Russian society; they are millionaires and multimillionaires, but (with four exceptions) not 
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billionaires.2 I have updates to the present time for about a third of them, either because they 
regularly feature in the news, because they are friends of friends, or because they have 
become friends with me on Facebook. In addition to these elite interviews, I carried out 
participant observation, and I researched the lives and activities of upper class Russians 
online (using blogs, media reports and interviews in newspapers). I also undertook 
approximately 40 additional interviews with people who have known the wealthy from a 
particular perspective, the type of people Goffmann (1951) called curator personnel, among 
them wealth managers, personal assistants, journalists, art experts and interior decorators.   
 
The article first traces the changes of the last twenty years, evolving from the demonstrative 
ostentation of the 1990s to new forms of flamboyance in the late 2000s, as expressed in the 
interviewees’ lifestyles. The second section will discuss two forms of adornment: first, the 
expression of superiority and status through sartorial signs; and, second, vicarious 
ostentation via female companions. Another, though less obvious, expression of modified 
tastes are attitudes to means of transport, the Moscow Metro in particular. A final section will 
discuss the importance of the Russian/Soviet intelligentsia as a bridge between money and 
culture3 as expressed in my interviewees’ statements.  
 
Post-Soviet transformation 
 
The break-up of the Soviet Union left a vacuum in terms of what constituted markers for 
social distinction. People were thrust into a context in which many of their assumptions about 
status, professionalism and respectability no longer held in their familiar ways (Patico 2008: 
6). The New Russians of the 1990s had no established role models to emulate (cf. Graham 
2003). A specific of post-Soviet society was that everybody with money had acquired it just 
recently. Thus, in economic terms, everybody who became rich was a parvenu. 
 
In this specific context, economic resources were the primary basis for the social position of 
the new moneyed classes, as well as their most prevalent virtue (Goscilo 2003: 10). In many 
aspects, Russia’s nouveaux riches followed the logic described by Veblen (1994[1899]: 24) in 
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relation to Chicago’s leisure class of the 1890s, where private property had become the basis 
of esteem and the new rich marked their social position through the parading of wealth. As in 
the USA a decade earlier, in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s the quantitative element 
and conspicuousness in consumption dominated (cf. Oushakine 2000). Many people eagerly 
embraced everything that was new and superlative in size, quantity and novelty, of which they 
had felt deprived in Soviet times. Naked economic power was aggressively put on display. By 
bluntly displaying their quickly and often brutally achieved success, the nouveaux riches 
exhibited quite plainly the arbitrary force by which they originally accumulated their wealth (cf. 
Bourdieu 1996). 
 
In the course of the 2000s, however, some parts of the elite began to distance themselves 
from glitz and glamour. Two famous people in public life illustrate this recent development. 
Kseniya Sobchak, born in 1981 and the daughter of the first post-Soviet mayor of St 
Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, became a household name as Russia’s Paris Hilton and the ‘it 
girl’ of the Putin era. (Putin is, incidentally, widely rumoured to be her godfather.) Goscilo and 
Strukov (2011: 11) excluded her from their volume on glamour in contemporary Russia 
because of the nature of her notoriety which rendered her a too-obvious case. In the winter of 
2011/12, however, Sobchak became one of the faces of the opposition movement and joined 
the street protests. During these months, she dated the political activist Ilya Yashin, born in 
1983, who stood in stark contrast to the elderly rich businessmen she previously chose as 
boyfriends. While still being a media celebrity, she now enjoys new prominence as a journalist 
and political activist, rather than as a glamour queen.  
 
The second example is Mikhail Prokhorov. Formerly the richest Russian and the stereotypical 
playboy oligarch, he was detained on his holiday in the French ski resort of Courchevel in the 
winter of 2007 on suspicion of providing prostitutes for his male entourage. Since then, 
Prokhorov’s public image has changed radically. He launched the media project Snob with 
which he endeared himself to upper-middle-class intellectuals, and ran for the presidency in 
2012. The projection of this new and serious image was enhanced by the oligarch’s highly 
educated and articulate sister, the founder of New Literary Observer, one of the first 
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intellectual journals and publishing houses in independent Russia, who supported him in the 
election campaign.  
 
Both these examples are certainly not uncontested, and many criticize these individuals both 
for their pasts and for their current half-hearted positions between Putin’s regime and the 
opposition. However, they reflect a shift away from an endless party lifestyle to more 
discerning, cautious tastes and values and to a ‘new modesty’. Modesty in this study is not to 
be understood in terms of a frugal lifestyle or radical cuts in one’s expenditure. It means, in 
the first place, that people, to some extent, turned away from the ostentatious behaviour and 
the demonstrative display of wealth which was typical of the preceding years.  
 
To refrain from the open display of wealth was important for Arkady4, one of Russia’s longest-
standing businessmen. The 49-year-old earnest and quiet man from a Jewish intelligentsia 
background touched upon the changes of the last two decades:  
At first we tried to understand what kind of opportunities we had based on our 
material resources, but now we don’t think about that anymore. We started to live in a 
different way. We started to think in a different way. 
For his wife, Larissa, modesty did not mean self-restraint. She explained her idea of modesty 
to me while we were driving in her Porsche from her house to a nearby restaurant:  
What is modesty? Modesty can express itself in many things. I can’t quite say that I 
live ascetically. I think that modesty is the antonym to ruthlessness, and ruthlessness 
is absolutely the worst thing you can find in a person.  
The couple’s affluence posed a challenge in the upbringing of their two sons. Larissa 
explained:  
We know a huge number of golden youth; they are destroyed by money and 
opportunities from the very beginning. Back in the Soviet era that was less the case, 
though it did exist then as well. It’s not in the children’s interests. I tried hard to limit 
the influence of our affluent material conditions on my children… We had to think 
about it all the time and control the process very strictly. 
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Larissa and her husband Arkady are trend-setters for some aspects of new tastes. The 
couple’s summer house is located in a new housing complex in the north of Moscow which 
was built in conscious dissociation from the 1990s grandiose palaces of the nouveaux riches 
found in Moscow’s notorious luxury suburb Rublyovka, where Putin has his residence. The 
housing in their area is newly built in the traditional wooden styles with modern elements 
similar to the contemporary wooden architecture in Scandinavia and Switzerland, albeit in far 
bigger dimensions. The individual houses ‘disappear’ into the forest and thus follow the trend 
to stay private and be invisible to observers. There are also globally recognized luxury 
features: yachts and other boats, a sailing club and a golf club. Arkady stressed the 
exclusivity of the area:  
This is a kind of a closed club. There is nothing comparable in the whole country. I 
think even in the West there are only very few such places... The most renowned 
architects have worked for us, Russian and foreign architects. Many architects dream 
about working for us. 
After a day out at this dacha, Arkady explained to me that his aim was to show me that his 
family has little in common either with ordinary Russian, or the ‘tasteless’ rich.  
 
32-year-old Maksim, a businessman and lawyer, rejected some forms of ostentatious 
behaviour. However, he indulged in others. Social distinction does not necessarily exclude 
eclecticism and cultural ‘omnivorousness’, as Peterson and Kern stated (1996) and Bryson 
(1996) corroborated vis-à-vis musical taste. High-status groups not only participate more than 
others in high-status activities, but also tend to participate more frequently in many different 
kinds of leisure activities, partly even ‘poor chic’ (Halnon 2002) – a ‘recreational’ and 
temporary ‘consumption of poverty’ which she described as a short, safe, socially-distanced 
and sanitized experience. It was precisely the eclecticism in his lifestyle which this young 
businessman (who, according to the contact person who gave me his phone number, had first 
made his money by trading in Duma seats in Russia and trading in land mines in Africa) 
seemed to enjoy. This father of two (his older child, a son, is already 13) likes gambling in 
casinos, going to strip clubs, indulging his extravagant eating habits, and staying only at the 
best hotels when travelling. Yet in some matters he also exercises practices that could be 
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described as a flamboyant reversal from these norms (shopping at cheap street markets and 
upholding some liberal and left-wing views, vocally defending gay rights, sending his children 
to the Pioneers and admiring Stalin). During our opulent dinner, he reached for his wallet and 
pulled out a Metro ticket:  
I can waste money on ‘de luxe’ hotels but I can just as easily take the Metro… I travel 
by Metro every day. I even have a monthly travel card. Have a look! My friends 
always make fun of me. I can allow myself to do that. 
 
Adornments: sartorial signs and women as means of display 
 
Changing tastes and social hierarchies are easily gleaned from how people dress (cf. 
Klingseis 2011). According to Simmel (1919), fashion is an excellent means of achieving, on 
the one hand, cohesion or group identity, and, on the other, differentiation and individuality. 
Through fashion people align with a certain group and differentiate themselves from others, 
and at the same time fashion is a widely understood way of expressing one’s status, wealth 
and power. The display of the people one surrounds oneself with can be part of ostentation. 
Particularly visible in Russia are female companions. Veblen (1994[1899]), and later Sombart 
(1967[1913]), linked the first conspicuous form of property to the ‘ownership’ of women. In 
Veblenian terms (1994[1899]: 27), youthful wives and mistresses are ‘trophies’ designed to 
show off a man’s success, not only suggesting sensual pleasures and, in their quantitative 
dimension, promoting an image of exceptional virility (Daloz 2009: 142), but often carrying 
added enhancements (dress, jewels, etc.).  
 
Fashion statements identified by this study mirror the trend away from glamour culture and 
the rising prestige the intelligentsia now enjoys. The fashion historian Alexandre Vassiliev 
observed that ‘glamour is out’ (Klingseis 2011: 105). There is instead a new trend emerging – 
‘“new modesty”, with fashion becoming intellectual’. However, this process is far from linear 
and unambiguous. The ‘new modesty’ in fashion is characterized by two codes; first, avoiding 
being overdressed (and preferably being slightly underdressed) and, second, dressing 
appropriately for every specific situation and occasion. This does not mean spending less 
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money on clothes or a greater relaxation in dress codes but rather a new form of 
conspicuousness. Dressing down is less standardized and reveals more of one’s individual 
tastes, which symbolically constitute the sum of the holdings of one’s cultural capital (cf. 
Savage, Warde and Devine 2005: 40). Misconceived aesthetic decisions might convey even 
damaging messages about the self (Warde, Olsen and Martins 1999: 120). Moreover, it 
involves getting changed frequently. (Now foreigners in Moscow are easily identifiable by their 
‘inappropriateness’; for example, Russians would not go to certain upmarket nightclubs in 
suits, but Westerners do when they come straight from work without getting changed.) 
 
According to his self-presentation, Maksim was the height of ostentation with regards to 
dressing down. (This young man was rather large, so it was difficult for me to make out the 
cut and style of his jeans and shirt.) He described his shopping behaviour:  
 I can buy myself a shirt for 1000 dollars but I wear a shirt costing 100 roubles [GBP2], 
because that’s not important to me at all. For my wife it’s a little more important, but 
not fanatically so. She likes comfortable clothes, and the problem is that comfortable 
clothes are usually branded clothes, which are expensive. Just recently she took 
ages looking for a pair of glasses. In the end she bought Gucci glasses which were 
incredibly expensive. She didn’t buy them because they were from Gucci but because 
they really fitted well. If she had found suitable glasses for 500 roubles [GBP10], she 
would have bought them. By the same token she can buy shorts for the kids at the 
market for 250 roubles [GBP5] and shorts in a boutique for 250 dollars… These 
jeans, I think, I bought second-hand. 
 
There is no guarantee in Russia that the people Maksim encounters possess sufficient 
‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1989) to be able to evaluate his statements of ‘new simplicity’. 
The entrepreneur is aware of this, and so were other interviewees, which is why they often 
combine their ‘simple’ clothing with carefully chosen luxury items that signal more 
conventional status markers. These are primarily watches, shoes, and, most importantly, 
delicately manicured hands. Maksim uses an ultra-expensive phone:  
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The only little thing that is important to me is my phone. I’ve got a golden mobile 
phone. I don’t like expensive watches. But sometimes in meetings it’s necessary to 
show a phone that is more expensive than an average car. This will put the opponent 
in the right place. 
The advantage of using a phone as a status marker is that it can remain invisible if the owner 
wishes. 
 
Dressing down is not a mass phenomenon, and the various new fashions exist alongside old 
ones among the people I could observe. In particular, at semi-formal events such as private 
receptions, it is not unusual to see men in their best suits and young model-like women in 
designer dresses alongside sloppily dressed male guests (for ‘dressing down’ is generally a 
male phenomenon, with the exception of some highly successful females). Breaking free from 
certain conventions is one way of asserting one’s superiority over others (Daloz 2009: 68). 
Fashion choices seemed to reflect the status hierarchies among the guests at a preview party 
hosted by Sotheby’s, which took place in 2008 at Barvikha, a town of villas in Moscow’s 
luxury suburb Rublyovka. The scruffily dressed guests were all big names; owners of 
publishing houses, famous art collectors and wealthy businessmen.  
 
Dressing slightly scruffily is not uncommon among privileged circles in many cultures, for 
instance, among some English aristocrats. There were a fair number of the latter at an art 
opening in Norfolk in May 2013 which was exhibiting masterpieces from the Hermitage. 
Prince Charles was the exhibition’s patron. His helicopter was met by the wife of the lord who 
was hosting the event; she was dressed in what one of the guests called pyjama trousers and 
a vintage blazer. The former model, 23 years younger than her husband, later joined a table 
with her similarly informally dressed friends. Meanwhile, the sponsors of the exhibition were 
queuing up to greet the Prince of Wales. One of the sponsors waiting patiently was Alexander 
Lebedev, the funder of the Independent and London Evening Standard. The Russian 
billionaire was in white high-top basketball shoes, a jacket, a waistcoat, a thin tie and super-
skinny black jeans. He was accompanied by his wife, a model 26 years his junior, who was 
wearing a long, low-cut, very tight dress which showed off her slender figure.  
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It could be argued that the ‘sloppy’ attire of some of the status-high individuals at both of 
these events served to stress their superiority over the common guests, who, with the 
exception of some artists, stuck to the rules and dressed smartly. Yet the basic codes were 
very different. The Russian billionaire, although securing a handshake from the Prince of 
Wales and presumably showing some respect by means of his waistcoat and tie, at the same 
time alluded to his merit-based success by emulating Bill Gates more than the English 
aristocracy. The youthfulness and exceptional beauty of the two wives referred to above were 
vicarious assertions of these men’s status, however different the women’s fashion statements 
were, with the hostess demonstrating that this was her home and the billionaire’s wife 
stressing her femininity.  
 
A strong accentuation of femininity and physical attractiveness was characteristic for post-
Soviet Russia and was intensified through the ‘trade’ some engaged in, seeking material 
security and financial benefits by making a ‘good deal’ (Zdravomyslova and Temkina 2005: 
110). The economic meltdown of the 1990s further strengthened the commodification of 
personal relationships. One of my interviewees, Dmitry, a well-known politician, aged 36, 
made the point that flaunting stunningly beautiful wives and mistresses, dressed in the most 
elegant and expensive attire, was a substitute for buying yet another Mercedes which nobody 
would notice anyway. However, even here the quantitative dimension and sensational beauty 
have lost some of their importance for social distinction in Russia. Indeed, Nikita, the head of 
a large consulting agency, asserted that socially inferior women, regardless of their beauty, 
might now even undermine one’s standing in society: ‘The fashion to go out with and maybe 
even marry models has disappeared here in Moscow. This has moved to the provinces and 
lower social strata.’ Instead, women who were still unquestionably attractive but at the same 
time highly sophisticated could boost one’s image more effectively. As he put it: ‘Now women 
must be very well educated and cultured’. In addition, some of my interviewees remarked that 
having a long and stable marriage had become an insignia of distinction in today’s Russia, 
and this was even more the case if the marriage predated the acquisition of riches. 
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All the same, keeping mistresses appeared to be tolerated, if not almost expected. Even if my 
male interviewees stressed their conservative family values and were proud of their stable 
marriages, some of them still alluded at some point in the interview to extra-marital activity, 
including hints about prostitutes. Pyotr is a businessman who is also highly regarded among 
the Moscow intelligentsia and considered to be one of the ‘cultured’ entrepreneurs. This man, 
in his early fifties and a married father of three, was born into the intelligentsia and taught at a 
prestigious Moscow university. I met him again 18 months after the interview at a conference 
on a Greek island, which was financed and hosted by a Russian oligarch and featured ultra-
conservative speakers from all over the world advocating traditional family values. Pyotr was 
accompanied by a young woman who was not his wife and who looked as if she was in her 
late teens. When I expressed my surprise about the age difference to the friends I was sitting 
with, i.e. male sociologists from Moscow, they defended the businessman by referring to the 
West where men were simply more hypocritical and pretended to be ‘prim and proper’. My 
friends, who were the same age as Pyotr, acknowledged that they would not be able to enjoy 
comparable female company themselves due to their meagre university salaries, but they 
very much approved of the businessman’s achievements. 
 
Vehicles and transport 
 
Vehicles and other means of transport satisfy various needs and desires. These needs and 
desires can be practical as well as symbolic (Daloz 2009: 76). They provide distinction vis-à-
vis other classes (this is especially the case with the visibility of cars), protection from 
observers (e.g. cars with opaque windows) and differentiation between elites themselves, as 
demonstrated by the world of yachts, helicopters and private jets.  
 
The connection between social hierarchies and vehicles has had enormous significance 
throughout cultures and history. Gronow and Zhuravlev (2010: 133; 132–40) analyse the role 
of cars, scarcity and luxury in stratifying Soviet society. The highest ranks of the leadership 
travelled in Chaikas. These black seven-seater limousines were produced in small numbers 
at the Gorky car factory after 1958 exclusively for the highest-ranking state and party officials. 
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KGB officers and other privileged members of society used chauffeur-driven black Volgas. In 
theory these could be bought by ordinary citizens, but as only a relatively small number were 
produced, to drive one’s own Volga was, as Gronow reminds us, probably the greatest 
unattainable dream of many Soviet citizens.  
 
Aleksei, a 49-year-old businessman who built up a brand empire every child in Russia knows 
and who is listed at about 100 on Russia’s Forbes rankings, recalled a childhood memory:  
Back then a black Volga was an important status indicator. It was a sign that its 
owner had achieved something. You had to be a boss or a director. I always wanted 
to be a director and drive a black Volga. It was the smell of this car. My father often 
took me on business trips to Moscow. You had to get up early. Then you had to wait 
for this car to come out of the factory gates. The town was still asleep, so you could 
hear the car minutes before you would see it. Then the road, the conversations in the 
car. It’s a memory so vivid and close, as if I was this little boy again. Now I’ve got 
many cars and no longer any Volgas. But, sadly, the excitement has gone. 
Everything becomes routine. But exactly these feelings of youth and these desires 
can move and motivate a person to achieve something in life. 
  
In contrast to adornment and sartorial considerations, elite modes of transport also have 
concrete functions of comfortableness and rapidity (Daloz 2009). When they come with a 
chauffeur, they clearly facilitate everyday life, enabling the owner to make use of the time 
spent travelling. This logic does not pertain just to the vehicles themselves but also to certain 
‘accessories’ and how vehicles are used. Russia’s elites appropriated advantages for their 
own benefit which were designed for special public purposes. Certain number plates and 
emergency sirens confer the right to exceed the legal speed limits. Express lanes in particular 
are a huge practical convenience when the streets leading from the luxury suburbs to 
Moscow’s city centre are blocked by traffic jams, which are frequently caused by street 
closures to let high-ranking officials pass at high speed.  
 
 15 
Following the near collapse of the city’s road infrastructure, some of my interviewees have 
adopted traditional symbols of the lower strata and started using Moscow’s Metropolitan 
Transport System. Boris Groys (1992: 160–66) described Stalin’s grandiose prestigious 
project with its beautiful stations as both utopia and hell. It is one of the most brilliantly 
designed underground systems in the world, not always pleasant to use but quick, efficient 
and comprehensive. As expected, for most of my interviewees, the idea of using the Metro 
was utterly absurd. They treated the Metro with indifference or disdain. Viktor, 42, a 
businessman from a Jewish intelligentsia background who had also set up a foundation for 
social science research, was surprised at the suggestion: ‘No, I never use the Metro. I’ve got 
my driver. My children? No idea.’ Many passed on their disdain to their children. Twenty-one-
year-old Andrei, the son of a businessman who had set up the second largest company in its 
field in Russia, told me:  
When I went to the kindergarten, I already had a driver. I only used the Metro on 
weekends to meet up with friends when the driver had a day off. Public transport is 
very unpleasant, stuffy, the queuing. The Metro is just terrible. 
 
All the same, some people are slowly changing their minds as Moscow’s traffic jams have 
begun to make it impossible to get to their destination. The oil-businessman Ivan, in his early 
sixties, lives in Surgut, an oil-rich city in Siberia. He tries to avoid using the road when in 
Moscow:  
 In Surgut I go by taxi, in Moscow by Metro. I simply can’t stand these traffic jams 
here. I’d go completely mad… I know, I’m an absolute exception. Nobody else goes 
by Metro. I love it that my life is so different from that of other people of my kind. 
 
Ivan is not actually as exceptional as he might think. The businessman Aleksandr, also in his 
early sixties, returned to using the Metro after one and a half decades of abstinence:  
In the early 1990s, I stopped using the Metro. But two or three years ago when these 
crazy traffic jams started, I started using the Metro again when I had to get 
somewhere quickly… I enjoy going down to the Metro. It works very well and there 
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aren’t actually that many people… You can see normal people there and I like 
watching their faces. 
I asked Aleksandr, a calm person and originally a trained accountant, how people reacted 
when he arrived at his destination by public transport. My question provoked surprise. ‘How 
would people know?’ The businessman usually sent his driver on the long traffic jam route 
hours ahead of him, so that he could be picked up shortly before reaching his final 
destination.  
 
A certain nostalgia for the Metro as it used to be is evident in Aleksei’s remark:  
Recently, about four months ago, when the traffic was just terrible, I used the Metro. 
I’m not scared to go down there. The only thing is that, compared to two years ago, I 
can clearly see how much poorer the folk have become. What unhappy people there 
are! And it’s dirty, very dirty. My Metro is definitely cleaner. My Metro is the Metro of 
the 1980s; my Metro represents Moscow. 
Vitaly, a real estate developer, made a similar observation: ‘I use the Metro twice a year. It’s 
shocking sometimes what you see down there. The atmosphere has become so much worse 
compared to what it was like in Soviet times.’ 
 
Some of my interviewees made their children use the Metro as part of their upbringing. Kirill, 
a slick and earnest businessman and art collector in his early forties, was concerned that his 
daughters were getting spoilt:  
I came from a simple social background. I’ve seen everything. I served in the army. 
There is nothing much that can surprise me. Of course, I want my children to start off 
at a very different level than I did. But this involves the risk that they might not be 
aware that life can be very different as well. Our children use the Metro. We made a 
point of teaching them how to use it. We want them to use it as well as wanting them 
not to think that fashion is the most important thing in life but to develop different 
interests. 
 
Kul’turnost’ via the intelligentsia 
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The accumulation of economic capital during Perestroika and in the post-Soviet period was 
heavily dependent on non-economic resources, such as cultural capital and social networks. 
Post-Soviet studies have suggested that many supposed newcomers to the upper layers of 
the 1990s were not real parvenus from simple social backgrounds, but were the descendants 
of privileged and/or highly educated families (cf. Hanley, Yershova and Anderson 1995; King 
2002; Szelényi, Eyal and Townsley 1998). They made practical use of their cultural capital in 
the first years of social transformation, often assisted by the social capital they acquired in 
prestigious educational institutions or the Komsomol, which they turned into economic capital. 
In the new millennium, there has been a further shift in the dominance of capital forms. The 
accumulated economic capital has been increasingly transformed into cultural and symbolic 
capital.  
 
This continuity of social class was also frequently evident in the interviews I conducted. Many 
of my interviewees had inherited cultural capital through their families, some over several 
generations. The overwhelming majority of my interviewees were born into socially and 
culturally privileged families, many of them belonging to the Soviet intelligentsia. One of these 
is Russia’s most famous gallery owner Marat Guelman:  
It’s a bit of a paradox, but I would place myself amongst the intelligentsia. First, 
because of my family background; my father was a famous playwright. Gorbachev 
called him the father of Perestroika because he influenced Gorbachev a lot. They are 
still friends. Second, the nature of my professional activities; I deal with art. Third, I 
work with my mind. I’m a political consultant and for a long time I’ve worked as a 
spin-doctor [politekhnolog] for the president, which is like being a playwright in 
politics. 
 
Many interviewees’ parents, and in many cases also their grandparents, had pursued 
successful careers during Soviet times, mainly in science or engineering. There were also 
whole dynasties of people in academia. The family of the businessman Gregory is an 
example of a prestigious intelligentsia family. Gregory’s parents were geophysicists: ‘They did 
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groundbreaking work in engineering back in the 1960s. My father received a state award for 
what he had discovered and his name was entered into one of the republic’s encyclopaedias.’ 
The shy IT-entrepreneur in his mid-forties, whose start-up business put him on Russia’s rich 
list, is in some ways an idol for Russia’s creative intelligentsia scene. His business biography 
features in a 2013 movie.  
 
However, there was a novel aspect to this situation that came across strongly in my 
interviews: people ascribed symbolic significance to their social backgrounds and utilized 
them to position themselves in society. Social distinction needs to extend back into the past, 
and in particular to the grandparents’ generation. Whereas in the early post-Soviet years it 
was fashionable to discover aristocratic roots, today a Soviet intelligentsia background 
provides the ideal provenance for upper-class Russians. The intelligentsia has, as Gessen 
stated (1997: 102), with the exception of a short break in the 1990s, produced a steady 
stream of trends and fashions. Now, references to the intelligentsia have returned as a basic 
ingredient for kul’turnost’, and people from a prestigious intelligentsia background, such as 
the IT-entrepreneur Gregory, have gained in status among upper-class Russians. 
 
Karina and her husband, a wealthy businessman, offered an example for this shift: 
‘Financially, we belong to the upper class. But we’d certainly like to ascribe ourselves to the 
intelligentsia, beginning from our grandfathers’ generation. Of course, there are artists and 
writers in our circle. That’s a must.’ The 38-year-old woman explained further:  
 You can place us in the intelligentsia also in terms of our attitude to life and our moral 
and spiritual values, such as support for others, friendship, love, mutual 
understanding. The most important values are certainly integrity, propriety and good 
manners as well as ethical and aesthetic values. But of course, without money it’s all 
difficult.  
Karina’s statements are reminiscent of how Patico (2008: 77) traces kul’turnost’ in her 
research. Social and hereditary factors were understood to play a significant role; however, 
individuals were implicitly held responsible for their own level of kul’turnost’.  
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Many of the mythologies historically surrounding the intelligentsia, including its late-nineteenth 
century humanistic search for truth and its desire to serve the people, are not very relevant 
today. Nor is the dedicated, self-effacing, quixotic character which is often ascribed to the 
intelligentsia (cf. Leatherbarrow and Offord 2010). In fact, some of these features were 
already irrelevant to the Soviet intelligentsia, which was particularly status-anxious and 
concerned to keep its distance from the ordinary people (Gessen 1997). Nevertheless, this 
does not challenge the intelligentsia’s symbolic power and its elitist connotations. Boris, a 24-
year-old banker, is the son of a businessman who made a fortune in the 1990s, and yet he 
sees himself as part of the intelligentsia:  
In Russia there are two major social groups in society, the intelligentsia and the 
majority of the population. These two groups have no relation whatsoever with one 
another, except that they live in the same territory. The majority of Russians are 
totally different; I’ve got nothing in common with them. 
 
Boris’s understanding of the intelligentsia and of the structure of Russian society reflects the 
hierarchies and gaps between the classes. He was born into an intelligentsia family with a 
Jewish background. His grandfathers were scientists. His father quickly became one of the 
first three hundred richest men to appear on the worldwide Forbes rich list and used to be a 
player in Russian business. Boris’s upbringing in a luxury suburb was remote from the lives of 
ordinary Russians. In addition to this, it could be argued that his understanding of society as 
being based on two diametrically opposed groups, the intelligentsia versus the ordinary 
population, is the product of the interplay between the historically developed social 
hierarchies in Russia and the ways in which people in Russia have learned to understand the 
world (not least through classical literature).  
 
The symbolic significance of the cultured classes today is embodied by the businessmen 
among my interviewees who now spend most of their time on their art projects. According to 
Bourdieu (1984: 55), the fundamental advantage gained from membership of a privileged 
class is distance from economic necessity. This has resulted in some people becoming 
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dismissive of their own involvement in business. Yevgeny’s wife has taken over business 
matters so that he can devote almost all of his time to art. He explains why:  
I belong to the professional intelligentsia. My business is just a means to an end. I’m 
interested in dealing with global cultural projects. I belong to the part of the 
intelligentsia which seeks answers to eternal, philosophical questions [ishchushaya 
intelligentsia].  
Yevgeny, 60, sets the tone for members of an upper class who do not need to concern 
themselves with money-making but are free to ponder their individuality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article was to analyse strategies of distinction and symbolic expression of 
status which the upper-class Russians included in this study pursued in order to entrench 
their legitimacy. Using a Weberian framework, the article began with the assumption that 
these individuals wish to feel worthy of their positions in society, and they wish to be 
convinced that they deserve their position because of who they are and because of their 
qualities. To this end, they had to reorient their demeanour, manners and tastes in order to 
keep up with the social changes in post-Soviet Russia. The search for more enduring modes 
of distinction became particularly intense at a point of time when new wealthy layers in Russia 
had gained distance from economic necessity after the years of the 2000s oil boom, and yet 
they saw their position challenged by the arrival of the 2008 economic crisis, which 
confronted them with increased pressure for legitimation.  
 
In addition to Weber, Bourdieusian concepts proved helpful in tracing this search. Many of my 
interviewees, in one form or the other, converted the economic capital they possess in 
abundance into cultural and symbolic capital: i.e. ostentatious behaviour turned into a more 
moderate and private affair. The area where Arkady and Larissa built their dacha is an 
example of this where the logic of the housing complex is based on privacy and exclusivity. 
The modern woodwork aims to dissociate their tastes from the tastes of other upper ranks 
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who built grandiose palaces in the 1990s. All the same, they have adapted to globally 
recognized luxury tastes. 
 
With their closeness to the intelligentsia, individuals of the kind analysed here potentially set 
the preconditions of the ‘classe dominante’, as formulated by Bourdieu: a social class 
dominating not only the economic and political sphere, but also culture and society. Many of 
my interviewees ascribed great significance to their intelligentsia roots and social circles, 
which served as an important pillar of elitist distinction and helped with the articulation of 
bourgeois ideas, such as those embodied in kul’turnost’. Both in historical and contemporary 
contexts, kul’turnost’ has bestowed attributes of dignity and virtue on material possessions. It 
has instilled more discerning tastes, ‘good manners’ and civilized consumption into its 
holders, thereby acting as a bridge between economic capital and cultural capital. Some of 
my interviewees aimed to make this bridge more durable, and ensured that it reached into the 
future, by passing on kul’turnost’ to their children.  
 
However, these processes are far from linear. Most of the changes described carry their own 
new forms of flamboyance. Dressing down appears to be one straightforward, yet 
conspicuous way of demonstrating superiority over one’s peers. Moreover, Maksim’s golden 
mobile phone might not only be seen as a strategy to assert wealth and power, but also as an 
expression of status-anxiety. Apparent ‘democratic’ openness to crossing social boundaries 
by sharing social space with ordinary people, such as public transport, might not 
automatically imply that these practices will become routinized. Not least, competing norms 
and expectations, partly anchored in Russia’s patriarchal structure, might reverse a move to 
more privacy, as seems to be the case regarding the permissibility of openly displaying 
mistresses. In more general terms, it is still open which changes the latest political 
developments will bring to Russia’s social structure and what this will mean for the social and 
economic position of these individuals and, hence, for the symbolic expression of their status 
and their understanding of kul’turnost’.  
 
(Date accepted: October 2013)  
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Notes 
                                                        
1 Against the background of instable systems of dispositions in the late Soviet period and in early post-
Soviet Russia, people consciously experimented with their socially learned dispositions and skills in 
order to mobilize their resources. Unlike Bourdieu, I consider the dominating practices and ideas to be, 
at least in part, more of a conscious process than a case of forgotten history because in post-Soviet 
Russia routine daily practices had to be newly established. This is why I talk of strategies and not of 
habitus.  
2  Both class and status considerations were important in my study. According to a Weberian 
understanding, class is defined in terms of property and status in terms of the principles of the 
consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life (Weber 1978 [1922]: 937). 
3  To put it simply, the intelligentsia can be described as an educated populace (intellectuals and 
professionals engaged in the cultural and educational sector), from a culturally privileged background, 
imbued with certain (even if minor) social obligations. This group is not homogenous. My interviewees 
primarily mingled with elitist representatives of the intelligentsia, such as successful artists, filmmakers, 
writers and journalists, not with the poor(er) mass intelligentsia (cf. Shlapentokh 1999).  
4 I have changed the names my interviewees.   
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